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Recombinant innovation, the combination of existing ideas, is 
important for technological progress; we want to understand 
how important market frictions are in stiﬂing the transmission 
of ideas from one ﬁrm to another. Although the theoretical 
literature emphasizes the importance of these frictions, direct 
empirical evidence on them is limited. We use comprehensive 
data on patent applications from the European Patent Of- 
ﬁce and a multiple spells duration model to provide estimates 
that suggest that they are substantial. It is around 30% more 
costly to successfully discover and utilize new ideas created 
in another ﬁrm than in your own. This compares to the in- 
creased costs of accessing new ideas across national borders 
of around 7%, and across technologies of around 20%. These 
result point towards substantial imperfections in the market 
for technology. 
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m  . Introduction 
Technological progress is reliant on recombinant innovation - the recombination of
xisting ideas, where ﬁrms combine prior art with their own ideas to form new patentable
echnologies - now more than ever ( Henderson and Clark, 1990; Henderson and Cockburn,
990; Weitzman, 1998; Wuchty et al., 2007 and Jones, 2009 ). There is an extensive
heoretical literature that details the ways by which market frictions, such as incomplete
ontracts, transactions costs and intellectual property rights, might stiﬂe the transmission
nd use of ideas across ﬁrms, leading to less research than is socially desirable ( Scotchmer,
991; Green and Scotchmer, 1995; Bessen, 2004; Boldrin and Levine, 2013 ). 
Our contribution in this paper is to develop an empirically tractable model of search
nd innovation that we can take to data to learn about the size of these market frictions.
e estimate the increase in eﬀort that is required to successfully develop a new technology
hen it relies on transactions in the market, as opposed to internal to the ﬁrm. We use
ata on all patent applications made at the European patent oﬃce, matched to ﬁrm
tructures, to consider the length of time it takes a ﬁrm to build on an idea published in
 patent application made by a diﬀerent ﬁrm, relative to an idea published in a patent
pplication made within the same ﬁrm. 
In our data we see that on average it takes around 200 days longer for the ﬁrst citation
f a patent application to occur when that citation is by a diﬀerent ﬁrm than when it
s by the same ﬁrm, see Fig. 1 (data described below). Of course this could be due
o a large numb er of p otentially confounding factors; we use a multiple-spell duration
odel ( Griﬃth et al., 2011 ) to try to control for these. Our empirical approach controls0
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Fig. 1. Cumulative density of time to ﬁrst citation in days if cited within 5 years. 
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 for characteristics of the cited and citing patent applications; our identiﬁcation strategy 
relies on variation between the time it takes for the ﬁrst and second citation. Our central
estimate suggests that successful discovery and use of information that leads to a new
idea is around 30% more costly cross-ﬁrm than within-ﬁrm. 
We compare this to the costs of search across geographic space, to which the empirical
literature has paid a lot of attention, and to the costs of search across technological space.
This compares to a 7% increase in costs when it is across national borders rather than
within-country, and around 20% more costly across (4-digit) technology classes. These 
results suggest that the empirical magnitude of market frictions are substantial, and we 
interpret our evidence as pointing towards substantial imperfections in the market for 
technology. 
Our paper is related to several relevant literatures. The patent system grants a ﬁrm
monopoly rights over an idea for a ﬁxed p erio d, with the aim to provide monopoly rents
to improve incentive to innovate ( Schumpeter, 1943; Nordhaus, 1969 and Tirole, 1988 ), 
because there will be under-investment due to the public go o ds nature of ideas ( Nelson,
1959; Arrow, 1962; Shapiro, 2007 ). Some argue that patents facilitate technology transfer 
( Acemoglu et al., 2008 ), while others argue that they create a barrier to technology
transfer ( Bessen and Maskin, 2009 ). When new inventions build on old ones it is not clear
what impact intellectual property rights such as patents will have on total innovation 
( Scotchmer, 1991; Gallini and Scotchmer, 2002; Boldrin and Levine, 2008 , and Boldrin
and Levine, 2013 ). 
Weitzman (1998) , Wuchty et al. (2007) and Jones (2009) emphasise that recombinant 
innovation is growing in relevance due to the growing burden of knowledge, which re-
quires greater investments in human capital and team work and a greater reliance on
reusing existing ideas in new ways. van den Bergh (2008) and Zeppini and van den Bergh
(2013) provide a model of recombinant innovation and the role it plays in ﬁrms strategies
over product diversity. 
A separate literature emphasises that ﬁrms have incentives to make it costly for other
ﬁrms to build on their technology and eﬀectively develop new recombinant technologies 
( Chang, 1995; Arundel, 2001 and Horstmann et al., 2004 ). Williams (2013) provides
empirical evidence on the impact of intellectual property rights in stiﬂing technology 
transfer by looking at one technology; she provides evidence that patents on the human
genome hindered subsequent scientiﬁc research and product development. 
Also related to our work is the large literature that has considered the nature and
boundaries of the ﬁrm, and when technology transactions will occur in the market or
within the ﬁrm ( Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1971, 1975, 1979; Arrow, 1962; Mansﬁeld 
and Romeo, 1980; Davidson and McFetridge, 1984; Grossman and Hart, 1986 and more 
recently Bessen (2004) , Costinot et al. (2011) , Ponzetto (2012) and Irarrazabal et al.,
2013 ). In a recent paper, Alfaro et al. (2015) look at the empirical evidence regarding
ﬁrm boundary choices along the global value chain and ﬁnd that contractual frictions 
play an important role in ﬁrms’ choices on integration. 
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f  The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we lay out a simple model of
earch and discovery of ideas for recombination to create new patentable technologies. In
ection 3 we lay out our econometric approach to estimating the cost of search, discovery
nd use. In Section 4 we describe the data, and in Section 5 present our estimates. A
nal section summarizes and provides some ﬁnal comments. 
. Theoretical framework 
We develop a model in which the time and eﬀort it takes for inventors to develop
nd exploit a new idea depends on the eﬃciency with which they search and use prior
esults, and the expected value of the recombination when discovered. Research projects
o not typically start from scratch, but are based on earlier ﬁndings - what is termed
ecombinant innovation. Researchers devote time talking to other researchers, read aca-
emic journals, visit fairs and conferences, reverse-engineer a comp etitor’s pro duct, and
earch patent databases. The more eﬀort researchers puts into ﬁnding and accessing these
ctivities, the more likely it is that they develop a useful new technology. The model is
tark in that it focuses only on recombinant innovation, and in that sense is similar in
pirit to Cohen and Levinthal (1989) . 
In our model a researcher maximizes expected proﬁts by searching for a recombination
f existing technology with new ideas. The researcher decides how much eﬀort to spend on
earching for recombination of his own knowledge with knowledge of other researchers and
n subsequently developing that knowledge. A successful recombination of technologies
eads to a new innovation. 
The expected value of the new innovation, V new , depends on the value of the technology
t is built on, V old , and information available at time zero, Ω0 , for example, information
n future technological and demand opportunities. This can be written as 
v ≡ E( V new | Ω0 ) = V old + E( ε | Ω0 ) , (1)
here ε is the diﬀerence between the values of the new and old technologies, since V old is
nown at time zero. What matters in a researcher’s search decision is the expected value
f the new technology, not the realized value of it. The expected value v consists of V old
nd E( ε | Ω0 ). In the next section we show how we can control for v, which is unobserved
y the econometrician, in our econometric framework. 
For simplicity we start by assuming that the researcher only has one direction in which
o search for technology. We then introduce a second direction for which eﬃciency of the
earch process and the value of recombinant innovation may diﬀer. We assume that eﬀort
akes the form of expenditure by the researcher. In particular, the researcher has to spend
 t > 0 for all t to continue the project. 
Let T be the moment when a recombination of technologies is discovered by the
esearcher. T is a stochastic variable with marginal density function f ( t ) and survival
unction S ( t ). The expected revenue from searching for a short time interval [t, t + d t )
38 R. Griﬃth et al. / International Journal of Industrial Organization 50 (2017) 34–56 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 equals the value of the innovation times the probability of a recombination during that 
interval, given that the recombination has not occurred at an earlier time: 
Pr ( t ≤ T < t + d t | T ≥ t ) v. 
The search is stopped as soon as a suitable technology is found. The continuation cost
during [t, t + d t ) equals e t d t if the technology has not b een found b efore t + d t and zero
otherwise: 
Pr ( T ≥ t + d t | T ≥ t ) e t d t. 
The expected discounted proﬁts π at time zero can be expressed as the integral over
t of expected increments in proﬁts: 
E ( π) = 
∫ ∞ 
0 
exp ( −ρt ) E ( d πt ) . 
The value of the outside option is captured by the discount rate ρ. An expected increment
in proﬁts equals the expected increment in revenue minus the expected increment in cost: 
E ( d πt ) = Pr ( t ≤ T < t + d t | T ≥ t ) v − Pr ( T ≥ t + d t | T ≥ t ) e t d t. 
After some manipulation, the proﬁt increments can be written as a function of the hazard
λ( t ) that a recombination takes place at t . Speciﬁcally, 
E ( d πt ) = 
Pr ( t ≤ T < t + d t ) v − Pr ( T ≥ t + d t ) e t d t 
Pr ( T ≥ t ) 
= f ( t ) vd t − S ( t + d t ) e t d t 
S ( t ) 
= λ( t ) vd t − [ 1 − λ( t ) ] e t d t 
= [ λ( t ) ( v + e t ) − e t ] d t. 
The researcher can inﬂuence the hazard rate by varying eﬀort at any point in time. If
the response of the hazard rate to eﬀort is instantaneous, we can write the current hazard
as a function of the current eﬀort. In particular, assume that the hazard λ( t | e t ) is concave
and monotonically increasing in e t . The proﬁt maximization problem for the researcher 
is dynamic, but does not involve a state variable, as the hazard rate is not aﬀected by
previous decisions made by the researcher. 1 The researcher maximizes expected proﬁts 
by cho osing an exp enditure path: 
max 
e t 
∫ ∞ 
exp ( −ρt ) [ λ( t | e t ) ( v + e t ) − e t ] d t. 0 
1 The only possible eﬀect of previous decisions is that the search was successful at an earlier moment. 
If a technology is found, a new search can be started and optimal expenditure will be the same as if no 
technology had been found. 
R. Griﬃth et al. / International Journal of Industrial Organization 50 (2017) 34–56 39 
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tWe now introduce a second direction for which the eﬃciency of searching may diﬀer,
nd we allow the value of an invention to be diﬀerent across directions. Let the expected
alue of recombination of the researcher’s knowledge and a technology found in direction
 (“technology i ”) be v i and let the expected value of recombination with a technology
 b e v j . Exp enditure on search in one direction does not aﬀect the hazard rate in the
econd direction for given expenditure in the latter direction. 2 Once a suitable technology
as been found in either direction, searching in both directions is stopped. 
In the two-direction case the expected ﬂow of proﬁts depends on the expenditure on
earching in both directions: 
E ( d πt ) 
d t = λi ( t | e it ) v i + λj ( t | e jt ) v j − [ 1 − λi ( t | e it ) − λj ( t | e jt ) ] ( e it + e jt ) . (2)
he ﬁrst-order conditions for maximizing proﬁts yield the condition that the ratio of
arginal hazards should equal the inverse ratio of the values. That is, optimal expenditure
aths e ∗it and e ∗jt satisfy 
∂ λi ( t | e ∗it ) /∂ e 
∂ λj 
(
t | e ∗jt 
)
/∂ e 
= 
v j + e ∗it + e ∗jt 
v i + e ∗it + e ∗jt 
. (3)
q. (3) is a key equation to characterize the optimal expenditures. The following propo-
itions consider two polar cases. 
roposition 1. Suppose that search eﬃciency is the same between two technologies:
i ( t | e ) = λj ( t | e ) for all t and e. If v i ≥ v j , then e ∗it ≥ e ∗jt . 
roof. Let λ( t | e ) denote the common hazard function, that is λ( t | e ) = λi ( t | e ) = λj ( t | e )
or all t and e . If v i ≥ v j , it follows from (3) that 
∂λ( t | e ∗it ) 
∂e 
≤ ∂λ
(
t | e ∗jt 
)
∂e 
. 
s the hazard function is a concave function of eﬀort, e ∗it ≥ e ∗jt . 
Proposition 1 says that when the expected value of technology i rises relative to the
xpected value of technology j , then the hazard rate of ﬁnding technology i increases
elative to the hazard rate of j , provided search eﬃciencies are symmetric. In other
ords, it predicts that the ex ante more usefulness of recombination will lead to faster
atent citations. 2 If the researcher faced a budget constraint, an increase in search eﬃciency for one direction could lead 
o reduction of eﬀort in the other direction. 
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 Proposition 2. Suppose that values of recombination are the same between two technolo- 
gies: v i = v j . If 
∂λi ( t | e ) 
∂e 
≥ ∂λj ( t | e ) 
∂e 
f or all e, (4) 
then e ∗it ≥ e ∗jt . 
Proof. Since v i = v j , it follows from (3) that 
∂λi ( t | e ∗it ) 
∂e 
= 
∂λj 
(
t | e ∗jt 
)
∂e 
. 
Hence, if (4) holds, then it must be that e ∗it ≥ e ∗jt . 
Proposition 2 says that when the expected value of recombination is the same for both
directions, then higher search eﬃciency (expressed as a larger marginal increase in the 
hazard rate with respect to the expenditure) will result in faster patent citations. 
The two propositions together imply that any diﬀerence in hazard rates between the 
two directions can be due to diﬀerences in search eﬃciency, diﬀerences in the expected
value of technology, or both. In particular, Propositions 1 and 2 suggest that if we want to
investigate the eﬀect of barriers to knowledge diﬀusion we need to condition on expected
values of recombination. 
The expected values of recombination are intrinsically diﬃcult to observe. Recall that 
v j = V old, j + E( ε j | Ω0 ) . In other words, E( ε j | Ω0 ) represents the ex ante average diﬀerence
between values of new and old technologies in direction j . Suppose that the second term
E( ε j | Ω0 ) can be well approximated by observed characteristics of the citing patent (that
patent that makes the citation). This is a reasonable ﬁrst-order approximation since the 
ex ante average diﬀerence is determined at time zero. Therefore, we will use an estimation
method that is robust to unobserved quality diﬀerences in the cited patents V old, j , while
controlling for E( ε j | Ω0 ) by including characteristics of the citing patent. Once we control
for the expected value of recombination, then we can isolate diﬀerences in (marginal) 
search eﬃciency ( ∂ λi ( t | e )/ ∂ e ). In this paper, our focus is whether and to what extent
ﬁrm boundaries are a barrier to the diﬀusion of knowledge. Since other factors such as
geographic proximity are likely to aﬀect search costs, our estimation strategy controls 
for these other factors as additional explanatory variables. 
3. Econometric approach 
We are interested in investigating how ﬁrm boundaries aﬀect the cost of searching for
a new recombination. To isolate this eﬀect we use a multiple-spell duration model similar 
to that of Griﬃth et al. (2011) . 
Cross-ﬁrm citations are likely to diﬀer from within-ﬁrm citations for a number of 
reasons. Patents belonging to the same ﬁrm are more likely to have common inventors, 
R. Griﬃth et al. / International Journal of Industrial Organization 50 (2017) 34–56 41 
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(raw from inventions originating in the same geographical area, and to have similar
echnological characteristics. All these factors can potentially explain why cross-ﬁrm ci-
ations are slower. We control for cross-inventor citations, cross-border citations, and
ross-technology citations. If a substantial part of the cross-ﬁrm delay remains unex-
lained after controlling for these factors, we interpret this as suggesting that market
rictions aﬀect the citation duration. 
A fourth reason why citations between ﬁrms might diﬀer from citations within ﬁrms,
s that patents cited between ﬁrms are more valuable than patents cited within the ﬁrm.
nventions are more likely to lead to follow-up research when they are valuable, such
hat valuable inventions have larger probability of being cited. If, in addition, follow-
p research is more proﬁtable if it is based on a patent owned by the same ﬁrm, then
he expected value of cited patents will be smaller for within-ﬁrm citations then for
ross-ﬁrm citation. Ignoring heterogeneity in the value of cited patents could lead to
nderestimation of the cross-ﬁrm citation delay. It is therefore crucial that we control for
unobserved) characteristics of cited patents. 
We follow the literature that uses patent citation information as a direct measure of the
ecombination of knowledge. The citation of one patent application by another strongly
uggests that the ﬁrst patent application contained useful knowledge which helped the
econd innovation. 3 As in Griﬃth et al. (2011) , we consider the intensity with which a
atent is cited, and adopt a duration modelling framework that explicitly deals with the
roblem of unobserved patent characteristics that may be correlated with location or
ther characteristics. 
Consider a patent application that will be cited by other patent applications. The
ime it takes for a patent to be cited is expected to be shorter if eﬃciency of searching
s higher. This is especially relevant for the ﬁrst few citations a patent receives as they
re more likely to reﬂect newly acquired knowledge. 
As emphasised in Section 2 , ﬁrms will also search harder if the expected value of
nding new recombination is larger. The ex post value of a recombination is not known
rior to invention; we assume that the expectation that researchers have about the value
f a recombination is a function of the value of the patent application on which they
ntend to build. High-quality patents are more likely to lead to a new recombination
han patents with a low quality. We treat the quality of cited patents as an unobserved
to us) characteristic. We estimate how the hazard of being cited diﬀers for citations
ithin ﬁrms and citations between ﬁrms. We control for unobserved characteristics of
he cited patent by using a method that is analogous to ﬁrst-diﬀerencing a linear model
 we compare citations that are adjacent in time for each cited patent (in particular, the
rst and second citations). 
Let citing patents be indexed by k and let cited patents be indexed by  . A citation of
 by k has a duration T , which is deﬁned as the number of days between the application k 
3 A classic paper in this literature is Jaﬀe et al. (1993) . Also, see the monograph by Jaﬀe and Trajtenberg 
2002) and other recent work ( Thompson and Fox Kean, 2005; Thompson, 2006 ). 
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 date of the cited patent and the application date of the citing patent. Let X  k be a vector
of other observed attributes of citation T  k (including attributes of k that do not vary
with  ) and let V  be the unobserved characteristics of the cited patent. 
We model the hazard λ that patent  is cited by k after t  k days, conditional on
X k = x k and V  = v  , as 
λ( t k | x k , v  ) = θ ( t k | v  ) exp ( x ′ k β) , (5) 
with θ ( ·) being a cited-patent speciﬁc baseline hazard function and β a vector of coeﬃ-
cients to be estimated. The empirical speciﬁcation in (5) is motivated by the theoretical 
framework in Section 2 , taking the particular shape of a mixed proportional hazard
model. We aim to estimate eﬀects of search costs using characteristics of citing patents
( X  k ), while controlling for diﬀerences in values of cited patents with ﬁxed eﬀects V  . 
A patent can be cited by more than one other patent, so there can be multiple spells
for a cited patent. We allow the attributes X  k and the unobserved characteristics V  to
be correlated arbitrarily, but are assumed to be constant over time. We assume that V  
is constant across citing ﬁrms, implying that a technology has the same ex ante value to
everyone and is not more valuable to one ﬁrm than another. The baseline hazard function
θ ( ·) depends on the unobserved characteristics of the cited patent and is left unspeciﬁed.
That is, the baseline hazard function is allowed to diﬀer across cited patents in a general,
unspeciﬁed way. The attributes X  k include 0–1 indicator variables for, amongst others, 
between-ﬁrm citations, cross-border citations, and cross-technology citations. The hazard 
rate will be smaller for citations that are more costly. 
We can estimate the coeﬃcients β without knowing the cited-patent speciﬁc baseline 
hazard by exploiting observations on cited patents that receive multiple citations. As- 
suming that X  k and X k ′ ( k  = k ′ ) are independent of each other conditional on X  k , X k ′ ,
and V  , we can follow the conditional likeliho o d approach of Griﬃth et al. (2011) . 4 The
intuition behind this approach is the following. Suppose a patent receives two citations. 
The probability that the observed ﬁrst citation is ﬁrst conditional on the duration of the
ﬁrst citation and conditional on the characteristics of b oth citations, is indep endent of
the baseline hazard: 
Pr [ T  1 ≤ T  2 | T  1 = t  1 , X  1 = x  1 , X  2 = x  2 , V  = v  ] 
= θ ( t  1 | v  ) exp ( x 
′ 
 1 β) 
θ ( t  1 | v  ) exp ( x ′  1 β) + θ ( t  1 | v  ) exp ( x ′  2 β) 
= exp ( x 
′ 
 1 β) 
exp ( x ′  1 β) + exp ( x ′  2 β) 
, (6) 
which does not depend on v  or θ ( ·). For patents that are cited twice or more it is
possible to estimate the coeﬃcients β without the incidental parameters problem. 4 See, also, Chamberlain (1985) , Ridder and Tunalı (1999) , Horowitz and Lee (2004) and Lee (2008) , 
among others. 
R. Griﬃth et al. / International Journal of Industrial Organization 50 (2017) 34–56 43 
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r  There remains a problem of censoring. We need to observe at least two citations to
mplement this estimator, but for a large number of patents we do not (yet) observe
wo citations. The exclusion of these censored observations can lead to sample selection
ias in the estimation results. For example, a patent application in 1999 is more likely to
ave received two citations than a patent application in 2004. Older patents are therefore
ore likely to be included in our sample than young patents. We correct for bias due to
ensoring in two stages. First, we exclude all patents that did not receive at least one
itation within ﬁve years of the application date. We view these as a diﬀerent type of
atents - either low quality, or for other reasons not relevant for recombinant innovation.
e restrict our analysis to the population of patents that receive at least one citation
ithin ﬁve years. Second, to correct for those patents for which we do not observe a
econd citation we weight all observations with the inverse censoring probability, as in
riﬃth et al. (2011) . This is valid if the censoring is independent of citation durations and
ovariates. See the appendix of Griﬃth et al. (2011) for further details of the conditional
aximum likeliho o d estimation metho d we have adopted. 
. Data 
We use data on European patent applications made between 1985 and 2004 from the
uropean Patent Oﬃce’s (EPO’s) Worldwide Statistical Patent Database (PATSTAT).
he number of days between the priority date of a patent application, which is the
pplication date of the ﬁrst patent application (anywhere in the world) for that invention,
nd the priority date of patents that are cited on that application provides information
n the time it takes for one invention to lead to another. 
Any legal person can apply for a patent, such that the applicant(s) listed on a patent
pplication can be subsidiaries of a ﬁrm, parent companies or natural persons. The legal
erson(s) listed as applicants might not be the ultimate owners of the patent. For our
urpose we are interested in the ultimate owner, as this is what is relevant for considering
he search costs and market frictions; therefore, we need information on the ownership
tructure of ﬁrms. Without this information, a subsidiary citing a patent from another
ubsidiary belonging to the same parent ﬁrm would be incorrectly identiﬁed as an inter-
rm citation. 
We use commercially available data on ownership structure for European ﬁrms
Amadeus) and US ﬁrms with European subsidiaries (Icarus) from Bureau Van Dijk
BVD). Names of corporate applicants in PATSTAT have been matched to BVD com-
any names in order to identify the parent ﬁrms of applicants. The matching procedure as
ell as the resulting database are described in Abramovsky et al. (2008) . Applicant names
ave been matched to company names for 15 European countries, four of which have been
ropp ed b ecause the number of patent applications from these countries is small. 5 The
emaining eleven European countries are: Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,5 The following countries are dropped: Czech Republic, Greece, Poland and Portugal. 
44 R. Griﬃth et al. / International Journal of Industrial Organization 50 (2017) 34–56 
Table 1 
Number of patent applications by country and industry of parent ﬁrm. 
BE, NL DE FR GB IT, ES SCA US Total 
Chemical 11,216 42,099 11,878 8101 5756 4816 68,696 152,562 
Electric 6704 30,914 13,198 6043 5715 4267 41,700 108,541 
Engineer 7887 52,164 18,365 10,145 12,126 9967 47,338 157,992 
ICT 10,645 18,744 11,623 5624 3580 7164 65,035 122,415 
Pharma 5455 11,051 5458 6617 3234 3860 37,639 73314 
Other 1837 6893 2404 1917 1203 1335 12,452 28041 
Total 43,744 161,865 62,926 38,447 31,614 31,409 272,860 642,865 
Notes : Number of applications for a European Patent between 1985 and 1999. Excludes applications by non- 
corporate applicants (individuals, universities, etc.). Includes patents that are not cited. The row “Other”
refers to applications without a Derwent Code. The country or country group of an application refers to the 
location of the parent company of the applicant. “BE” is Belgium, “NL” is Netherlands, “DE” is Germany, 
“FR” is France, “GB” is Great Britain, “IT” is Italy, “ES” is Spain, and “SCA” comprises Denmark, Finland, 
Norway, and Sweden. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and UK. We use information on parent ﬁrms 
in these European countries plus the US and EPO patent applications made by their
subsidiaries that are located in these countries. The sample p erio d of our data spans
from 1985 through 2004 and we focus on applications for a European patent between
1985 and 1999 to have a ﬁve-year window of forward citations. 
We identify the industries in which the technology developed in each patent is applied 
using the Derwent Innovation Index Manual Codes. Abramovsky et al. (2008) provide a 
comparison of Derwent Codes with NACE and International Patent Classiﬁcation (IPC) 
codes. Table 1 shows the number of cited patents by industry and country of the par-
ent ﬁrm. 6 Engineering, chemical, and ICT are the industries with the largest number of
patent applications. The pharmaceutical industry has the smallest number of applica- 
tions. The United States has by far the most patent applications, followed by Germany.
The three largest cells in the table are ICT and chemical in the US and engineering in
Germany. 
Identiﬁcation of the cited-patent ﬁxed eﬀects requires that we observe at least two 
citations per patent. Table 2 displays summary statistics for our data. The ﬁrst three
rows are proportions of all patent applications made by corporations. More than eighty 
percent of all patent applications since 1985 were not cited within ﬁve years. In pharma-
ceuticals this proportion is even higher. Nine percent of all applications received exactly 
one citation, another nine percent of all applications received two citations or more. 
Patent citations are censored at December 31, 2004. The patents that did not receive a
citation prior to that date may still receive a citation at a future date. As this applies a
fortiori for patents with a priority date approaching the end of 2004, citations to these
young patents are likely to be underrepresented compared to citations of older patents. 
We take censoring into account when estimating ( Section 3 ). 6 The industries are aggregates of Derwent Sections: “Chemical” includes the sections A, C, E, F, G, H, 
J, K, L, M, N; “Electric” includes S, V, X; “Engineer” includes P, Q; “ICT” includes W, T, U; “Pharma”
includes B, D. 
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Table 2 
Descriptive statistics by industry. 
Chemical Electric Engineer ICT Pharma Other Total 
Proportion of all patents (1985–1999) 
with ≥ 2 citations 0.102 0.080 0.070 0.095 0.081 0.097 0.086 
with 1 citation 0.093 0.087 0.083 0.090 0.062 0.084 0.085 
without citations 0.805 0.833 0.848 0.815 0.857 0.819 0.829 
Proportion of second citations 
Cross-ﬁrm 0.773 0.839 0.848 0.851 0.764 0.798 0.812 
Cross-inventor 0.939 0.971 0.966 0.974 0.936 0.959 0.958 
Cross-border 0.393 0.478 0.457 0.470 0.378 0.428 0.435 
Cross-tech. (3 digit) 0.080 0.152 0.806 0.090 0.055 N.A. 0.231 
Cross-tech. (4 digit) 0.125 0.211 0.825 0.158 0.107 N.A. 0.276 
Notes : Data consist of corporate applications for a European Patent between 1985 and 1999. The ﬁrst 
three rows are proportions of all patent applications in the sample; the other rows are proportions of all 
second citations of patent applications that have received their ﬁrst citation within ﬁve years. Citations may 
o ccur b etween 1985 and 2004. “Cross-ﬁrm” requires that the cited patent application and the citing patent 
application have diﬀerent ultimate owners. “Cross-border” requires that none of the inventors on the cited 
patent application is located in the same country as any of the inventors on the citing patent. “Cross tech.”
refers to a match between the Derwent Code of the cited and citing patent application (match at three- and 
four-digit level; a patent can be assigned several Derwent Codes). 
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p  The remaining rows of Table 2 show the proportion of second citations for our main
ariables of interest for patents that have received their ﬁrst citation within ﬁve years. A
itation is classiﬁed as a cross-ﬁrm citation if none of the applicants on the cited patent
elong to the same parent ﬁrm as any of the applicants on the citing patent. A citation is
onsidered to be a cross-inventor citation if none of the inventors on the citing patent are
lso listed as inventors on the cited patent. A cross-border citation requires that none of
he inventors on the cited patent are located in the same country as any of the inventors
n the citing patent. A cross-technology citation means that none of the Derwent codes
ssigned to the cited patent match any of the Derwent codes assigned to the citing patent.
e consider both three- and four-digit aggregation levels. Derwent manual codes, which
re published by Thomson, classify patents according to the industries in which they are
sed. We use Derwent codes rather than the standard International Patent Classiﬁcation
IPC) codes, as the IPC identiﬁes patents according to their technological similarity
nd not their economic relatedness. Using Derwent codes we can construct a measure of
echnological distance that better reﬂects the perspective of inventors than examiners.
b out 81 p ercent of citations are across ﬁrms, 96% are across inventors, 44% are across
ountries, and 23 (28)% of citations are across technology at the three-digit (four-digit)
evel. 
Stylized facts suggest that diﬀerences in ownership are associated with substantial
elays in the recombination of knowledge. The top panel of Table 3 shows the time it
akes for a patent to be cited for the ﬁrst time. It shows the number of days between the
riority date of the cited patent and the priority date of the citing patent. The ﬁrst line
as the average number of days for citations belonging to diﬀerent ﬁrms and citations of
atents belonging to the same ﬁrm. The average duration of citations between ﬁrms is
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Table 3 
Time to ﬁrst and second citation in days if cited within 5 years. 
Between ﬁrms Within ﬁrms Diﬀerence 
(days) (days) (days) (% of within ﬁrm) 
All ﬁrst citations 937 736 200 27 
Industry 
Chemical 903 705 198 28 
Electric 967 798 168 21 
Engineer 981 806 175 22 
ICT 953 745 207 28 
Pharma 810 625 185 30 
Other 937 728 209 29 
All second citations 1734 1179 555 47 
Industry 
Chemical 1703 1140 563 49 
Electric 1819 1283 536 42 
Engineer 1909 1366 543 40 
ICT 1630 1165 466 40 
Pharma 1516 957 559 58 
Other 1782 1190 591 50 
Notes : The data in the table are the average number of days between the priority date of the cited patent 
and the priority date of the patent that contains the ﬁrst (second) citation if the ﬁrst citation occurs within 
5 years. Industry “Other” refers to patents that were not assigned a Derwent code. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 937 days, while the average duration of citations within ﬁrms is 736 days. Cross-ﬁrm
citations are on average 27% slower than within-ﬁrm citations. The remaining part of 
the top panel of Table 3 displays the time to ﬁrst citation for ﬁve industries. Citations
take the least time in the pharmaceutical industry and take the most time in engineering.
This holds both for citations between ﬁrms and citations within ﬁrms. The relative lag of
citations between ﬁrm is smallest in electrical engineering and longest in pharmaceuticals. 
The bottom panel of Table 3 shows the time it takes for a patent to be cited for the second
time. Cross-ﬁrm citations are on average 47% slower than within-ﬁrm citations. Citation 
patterns across industries are similar between the ﬁrst and second citation. 
That citations between ﬁrms are slower than citations within ﬁrms is not just a prop-
erty of the mean citation time, but applies to the distribution of citation times as well.
Recall that Fig. 1 shows the cumulative density of citation time for between-ﬁrm citations 
and within-ﬁrm citations. 
The number of observations available for our analysis might app ear to b e small in com-
parison with studies on patent application at the United States Patent and Trademark 
Oﬃce (USPTO). This is because of a number of diﬀerences in the patent application and
examination process in the EPO and the USPTO. 
One main reason is that there is more innovation in the US than in Europe, and the
EPO is a younger organization than the USPTO. In addition, there are some institutional 
reasons. The novelty requirements of the EPO are more strict than those of the USPTO.
The EPO does not grant a patent when it is based on an idea that has been described
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Uefore, or used for the same purpose before anywhere in the world . The USPTO requires
hat the invention was not known by others in the United States , and that the invention
as not patented or described in a printed publication anywhere in the world. 7 As a
onsequence the number of patents granted by the USPTO is larger than the number of
atents granted by the EPO. 8 
In addition, EPO applicants are not subject to a ‘duty of candor’ ( Alcácer et al.,
008 ). The incentive for applicants to cite other patents is therefore much smaller for
PO patents than it is for USPTO patents. Not only does this imply that European
atents on average receive fewer citations than their US counterparts, it also means that
he proportion of EPO citations added by examiners is larger ( Criscuolo and Verspagen,
008 ). For this reason our main results are based on both inventor-added and examiner-
dded citations. Thompson (2006) shows that citations added by inventors are 20% more
ikely to match the country of the cited patent than examiner-added citations. This could
ead us to underestimated border eﬀects. 
Tables 4 and 5 give a description of variables used in the next section and presents
escriptive statistics for those variables. There are more cross-ﬁrm, more cross-inventor,
ore cross-border, more cross-tech, more cross-Atlantic citations in the second citations
han in the ﬁrst citations. 65% of citations are by ﬁrms with more than 100 patents and
bout 40% of citations are by triadic applications. 
. Empirical results 
.1. Main results 
We start by estimating the hazard function (5) . Column (1) of Table 6 presents the es-
imates using the Cox estimator with an indicator for whether the citation is made across
rms, including controls for the industry and country of the citing patents. This estimator
oes not control for unobserved cited patent characteristics or censoring, and uses only
rst citations. The negative and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient suggests that inventors are quicker
o cite patent applications within the ﬁrm than from a diﬀerent ﬁrm. Column (2) adds
ontrols for whether the citation is cross-inventor, cross-border and cross-technology, still
sing the Cox estimator with only ﬁrst citations. 
If citations within a ﬁrm tend to be quicker, this could simply be a reﬂection of the fact
hat inventor self-citations are more prevalent among citations within ﬁrms than among
itations across ﬁrms. Unsurprisingly, cross-inventor citations are notably slower than
itations to patents that share at least one inventor. The magnitude of the coeﬃcient for
cross-ﬁrm citations declines from −0.37 to −0.24. 
Searching for a patent that was applied for in another country can be more costly
han searching domestically, because of diﬀerences in language and terminology, and7 35 U.S.C. 102 Conditions for patentability; novelty and loss of right to patent. 
8 The diﬀerence in novelty requirements makes it more attractive for ﬁrms to apply for a patent in the 
S, as this already excludes the possibility of someb o dy else b eing granted a patent for the same invention. 
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Table 4 
Description of variables. 
Citation duration Number of days between the priority date of the cited patent 
and the priority date of the citing patent 
Cross-ﬁrm Equals one if none of the applicants on the citing patent have 
the same ultimate owner as any of the applicants on the 
cited patent 
Cross-inventor Equals one if none of the inventors on the citing patent are 
listed as an inventor on the cited patent 
Cross-border Equals one if none of the countries of the inventors on the 
citing patent match any of the inventor countries of the 
cited patent 
Cross-technology Equals one if none of the Derwent Codes at 4 (3) digit level 
on the citing patent match any of the 4 (3) digit Derwent 
Codes of the cited patent 
Citing ﬁrm has > 100 patents Equals one if the number of patents applied for by the citing 
ﬁrm (ultimate owner) during the sample p erio d is larger 
than 100 
Citations per patent of citing ﬁrm Equals one if the average number of citations received by 
patents applied for by the citing ﬁrm (ultimate owner) 
during the sample p erio d exceeds one 
Log patents per industry/country/year The natural logarithm of yearly number of applications per 
Derwent Section (2 digit) and country of citing ﬁrm 
(ultimate owner) 
Cross-Atlantic Indicator variable for citations on applications by US 
ultimate owners to applications by European ultimate 
owners, and vice versa 
Citing patent is triadic Equals one if a citing application is for an invention that also 
has patent applications with the USPTO and the JPO 
Examiner-added citation Equals one if the citation was added by the examiner (rather 
than the applicant) 
Industry dummies Indicator variables for Derwent Sections (2 digit) of the citing 
patent 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 because the probability of learning about a patent through other channels than searching 
a patent database will be smaller for foreign patents. Likewise, searching for a patent in an
unfamiliar technological ﬁeld is more costly than searching for patents in a related tech-
nological ﬁeld. The estimated coeﬃcients for cross-border citations and cross-technology 
citations are less than half of the size of the coeﬃcient for cross-ﬁrm citations. This sug-
gests that the eﬀect of ﬁrm boundaries is more than two times as strong as the eﬀects of
national borders or technology, though it is less than half the size of the cross-inventor
eﬀect. 
If an existing patent is particularly valuable, then this will induce researchers to seek
to build on this patent, rather than on a patent that is less valuable. If within-ﬁrm
recombinations are less costly or more rewarding than cross-ﬁrm inventions, this can 
make modest inventions more likely to be the result of within-ﬁrm recombinations. The 
average quality of patents cited across ﬁrms could be larger than the average quality of
patents receiving citations from the same ﬁrm. This could lead to underestimation of the
delay in citations to the patents of other ﬁrms. 
In column (3) we correct for biases due to heterogeneity in patent quality by using
the ﬁxed eﬀects estimator (6) , also controlling for right censoring. It is now necessary to
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Table 5 
Descriptive statistics. 
Variable First citation Second citation 
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Citation duration 809 427 0 1825 1600 1036 0 7230 
Cross-ﬁrm 0.68 0.47 0.00 1.00 0.75 0.43 0.00 1.00 
Cross-inventor 0.92 0.27 0.00 1.00 0.96 0.20 0.00 1.00 
Cross-border 0.39 0.49 0.00 1.00 0.44 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Cross-tech. (3 digit) 0.24 0.43 0.00 1.00 0.25 0.43 0.00 1.00 
Cross-tech. (4 digit) 0.29 0.45 0.00 1.00 0.30 0.46 0.00 1.00 
Citing ﬁrm has > 100 patents 0.65 0.48 0.00 1.00 0.65 0.48 0.00 1.00 
Citations per patent of citing ﬁrm 0.37 0.48 0.00 1.00 0.28 0.45 0.00 1.00 
Log patents per industry/country/year 6.43 1.13 0.00 8.48 6.53 1.15 0.00 8.53 
Cross-Atlantic 0.23 0.42 0.00 1.00 0.27 0.44 0.00 1.00 
Citing patent is triadic 0.41 0.49 0.00 1.00 0.39 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Examiner-added citation 0.98 0.14 0.00 1.00 0.97 0.18 0.00 1.00 
Table 6 
Estimation results. 
Coeﬃcient (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Cross-ﬁrm −0 .374 −0 .243 −0 .428 −0 .427 −0 .383 
(0 .01) (0 .01) (0 .02) (0 .02) (0 .02) 
Cross-inventor −0 .677 −0 .773 −0 .746 −0 .716 
(0 .02) (0 .04) (0 .04) (0 .04) 
Cross-border −0 .075 −0 .055 −0 .054 −0 .069 
(0 .01) (0 .02) (0 .02) (0 .02) 
Cross-technology −0 .005 0 .085 0 .087 0 .084 
(3-digit) (0 .03) (0 .04) (0 .04) (0 .05) 
Cross-technology −0 .113 −0 .240 −0 .223 −0 .219 
(4-digit) (0 .02) (0 .04) (0 .04) (0 .04) 
Citing ﬁrm has −0 .069 −0 .062 
> 100 patents (0 .02) (0 .02) 
Citations per patent of 0 .429 0 .420 
citing ﬁrm (0 .02) (0 .02) 
Patents per industry/country/year −1 .123 
of citing patent (0 .04) 
Cross-Atlantic citation −0 .083 
(0 .02) 
Citing patent is triadic 0 .099 
(0 .02) 
Examiner-added citation 0 .598 
(0 .05) 
Estimator Cox Cox Fixed eﬀects Fixed eﬀects Fixed eﬀects 
(censoring) (censoring) (censoring) 
Notes : Standard errors are reported in parentheses. The duration is the time between the priority dates of 
the cited and citing patent. All patents are included that have been cited at least twice and with the ﬁrst 
citation occurring within ﬁve years since the application date. The number of observations is 48,688. In each 
speciﬁcation, dummies are included for the countries and Derwent Sections of citing patents. 
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 use both ﬁrst and second citations to estimate the ﬁxed eﬀects estimator. Note that we
control for unobserved cited patent quality by using only within-cited-patent variations. 
The cross-ﬁrm coeﬃcient increases in absolute terms from −0.24 to −0.43, suggesting 
that the average expected value of recombinations based on a patent from within your
own ﬁrm is smaller than for recombinations based on patents of another ﬁrm. This is
consistent with Arrow’s replacement eﬀect ( Arrow, 1962 ). 
Controlling for the quality of inventions also changes the other coeﬃcients. The es- 
timated eﬀects of cross-inventor and cross-technology increase, which is consistent with 
the hypotheses that it is more diﬃcult to follow-up on other people’s inventions and that
it is more diﬃcult to combine distinct technologies. The decrease in the eﬀect of national
borders is statistically insigniﬁcant. 
Although we control for unobserved characteristics of the cited patents, it might be 
that our results are partly driven by characteristics particular to citing patents or ci-
tations. We add observable characteristics of citing patents in columns (4) and (5). In
column (4) two controls are added. First, ﬁrms that have many patents ( > 100) could
be more likely to cite one of their own patents, even if cross-ﬁrm citations would not
be slower than within-ﬁrm citations. Second, ﬁrms that own patents that receive many 
citations are likely to produce better patents and would therefore be more likely to cite
one of their own patents. 9 We ﬁnd that citations by large ﬁrms tend to be somewhat
slower and that citations by highly cited ﬁrms are considerably faster. The estimated 
cross-ﬁrm eﬀect, as well as the other estimates are not aﬀected. 
In column (5) we add four more regressors. The natural logarithm of the number of
patents per industry-country-year of the citing patent is included to take into account 
that patents are more prevalent in some industries, countries and years. For a 10% 
increase in the number of patents per industry-country-year of the citing patent, the 
coeﬃcient decreases by about 0.11 ( ≈ 1.12 × ln (1.1)). The negative sign of this coeﬃcient
is consistent with the estimated eﬀect of the “base” variable in Griﬃth et al. (2011) .
Second, an indicator for cross-Atlantic citations is included as citations of or by patents
owned by American ﬁrms might take longer than citations between European ﬁrms. As 
expected from the coeﬃcient of the cross-border eﬀect, cross-Atlantic citations have a 
negative eﬀect (are slower). Third, an indicator for citing patents that are also applied 
for at USPTO and JPO (triadic patents) is included. Triadic patents are more valuable, 
the expected value of research leading to these patents will also have been larger. This
increases the hazard rate of citations from a triadic patent. Fourth, an indicator for
whether the citation was added by the examiner (as opposed to the applicant), which
increases the hazard of being cited. Adding these four controls increases the absolute size
of the cross-border coeﬃcient but reduces that of the other coeﬃcients somewhat. 9 Recall that the variable labeled as “Citations per patent of citing ﬁrm” equals one if the average number 
of citations received by patents applied for by the citing ﬁrm (ultimate owner) during the sample p erio d 
exceeds one. 
R. Griﬃth et al. / International Journal of Industrial Organization 50 (2017) 34–56 51 
Table 7 
Estimation results by industry of ultimate owner of cited patent. 
Chemical Electric Engineering ICT Pharma 
Cross-ﬁrm −0 .471 −0 .428 −0 .419 −0 .311 −0 .321 
(0 .04) (0 .06) (0 .05) (0 .05) (0 .07) 
Cross-inventor −0 .744 −0 .975 −0 .625 −0 .609 −0 .701 
(0 .06) (0 .11) (0 .09) (0 .10) (0 .10) 
Cross-border −0 .045 −0 .016 −0 .053 −0 .058 −0 .077 
(0 .04) (0 .05) (0 .04) (0 .05) (0 .07) 
Cross-technology 0 .130 0 .121 0 .115 0 .036 0 .064 
(3-digit) (0 .09) (0 .10) (0 .15) (0 .09) (0 .15) 
Cross-technology −0 .235 −0 .224 −0 .316 −0 .109 −0 .304 
(4-digit) (0 .07) (0 .08) (0 .15) (0 .06) (0 .11) 
Citing ﬁrm has −0 .107 −0 .039 −0 .128 −0 .036 0 .115 
> 100 patents (0 .04) (0 .04) (0 .04) (0 .04) (0 .06) 
Citations per patent of 0 .470 0 .416 0 .457 0 .365 0 .360 
citing ﬁrm (0 .03) (0 .04) (0 .03) (0 .03) (0 .05) 
Patents per industry/country/year −0 .645 −0 .834 −0 .829 −1 .355 −0 .586 
of citing patent (0 .09) (0 .06) (0 .06) (0 .06) (0 .08) 
Cross-Atlantic citation 0 .024 0 .003 −0 .078 −0 .119 −0 .036 
(0 .05) (0 .05) (0 .05) (0 .05) (0 .07) 
Citing patent is triadic 0 .071 0 .183 0 .127 0 .070 0 .078 
(0 .03) (0 .04) (0 .04) (0 .03) (0 .05) 
Examiner-added citation 0 .610 0 .772 0 .629 0 .205 0 .674 
(0 .10) (0 .12) (0 .08) (0 .17) (0 .18) 
Observations 14,234 8,116 10,308 10,850 5,180 
Notes : Estimation results are for ﬁxed eﬀects estimation with censoring correction. Standard errors are 
reported in parentheses. For each industry of the parent ﬁrm all patents are included that have been cited 
at least twice and with the ﬁrst citation occurring within ﬁve years since the priority date. Dummies are 
included for the countries and Derwent Sections of citing patents. Country-industry combinations with a 
small number of observations were grouped together. 
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s  Our ﬁnal result suggests that the mean hazard rate of a citation across ﬁrms is 32%
maller ( 1 − exp ( −0 . 38 ) ) than the hazard rate for a citation within the ﬁrm. The eﬀect
f ownership on the speed of recombination is substantial, much larger than the delay
f recombination across geographic space (7%) or technological ﬁelds (13%, 3-digit and
-digit combined). 
.2. Robustness 
We consider the robustness of our results to four potential concerns. First, we consider
hether the eﬀects of ownership on the speed of recombination vary across industries.
econd, we consider only inventor added citations. Third, we split the sample into two
en year time p erio ds. Fourth, we use publication date rather than priority date. 
Table 7 shows the results for our ﬁnal speciﬁcation for subsamples of patent applica-
ions by industry of use (based on Derwent classiﬁcation). The diﬀerences across indus-
ries are generally modest. Cross-ﬁrm citations are fastest in ICT (a delay of 27%) and
lowest in chemical engineering 37%. These results only slightly diﬀerent from the delay
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Table 8 
Robustness. 
Applicant-added 1985–1994 1995–2004 Corrected Cross-inventor 
citations only publication citations only 
dates 
Coeﬃcient (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Cross-ﬁrm −0 .133 −0 .267 −0 .321 −0 .396 −0 .372 
(0 .22) (0 .04) (0 .05) (0 .02) (0 .02) 
Cross-inventor −0 .450 −0 .865 −0 .409 −0 .745 
(0 .32) (0 .07) (0 .07) (0 .04) 
Cross-border −0 .639 −0 .073 −0 .041 −0 .050 −0 .079 
(0 .27) (0 .04) (0 .05) (0 .02) (0 .02) 
Cross-technology 0 .122 −0 .009 0 .058 0 .073 0 .095 
(3-digit) (0 .43) (0 .09) (0 .09) (0 .04) (0 .05) 
Cross-technology 0 .194 −0 .189 −0 .219 −0 .206 −0 .232 
(4-digit) (0 .35) (0 .07) (0 .08) (0 .04) (0 .04) 
Citing ﬁrm has −0 .017 0 .005 −0 .047 −0 .067 
> 100 patents (0 .03) (0 .04) (0 .02) (0 .02) 
Citations per patent of 0 .632 0 .541 0 .468 0 .418 
citing ﬁrm (0 .03) (0 .03) (0 .01) (0 .02) 
Patents per industry/country/year −0 .663 −0 .721 −1 .131 −1 .148 
of citing patent (0 .10) (0 .11) (0 .03) (0 .16) 
Cross-Atlantic citation −0 .010 −0 .116 −0 .079 −0 .072 
(0 .04) (0 .05) (0 .02) (0 .03) 
Citing patent is triadic 0 .032 0 .055 0 .145 0 .103 
(0 .03) (0 .04) (0 .02) (0 .02) 
Examiner-added citation 0 .285 0 .287 0 .610 0 .656 
(0 .29) (0 .08) (0 .05) (0 .05) 
Observations 663 15,952 10,994 51,561 43,822 
Notes : Estimation results are for ﬁxed eﬀects estimation with censoring correction. Standard errors are 
reported in parentheses. All patents are included that have been cited at least twice and with the ﬁrst 
citation occurring within ﬁve years since the priority date. In each speciﬁcation, dummies are included for 
the countries of citing patents. In columns (1)–(3) and (5), the duration is the time between the priority 
dates of the cited and citing patent. In column (4), the duration is the time between the publication dates 
of the cited and citing patent, where 540 days are subtracted for cross-inventor citations. 
 
 
 
 
 of 32% found for the full sample. In the industry-by-industry estimates cross-border ci- 
tations are not signiﬁcantly slower than citations within countries (point estimates range 
from 2% to 7%). This is consistent with ﬁndings in Griﬃth et al. (2011) , Keller (2002) and
Thompson (2006) . At the 4 digit level, cross-technology citations are 10% (ICT) and 20–
27% (other industries) slower. This is consistent with the delay of 20% found for the full
sample. 
Table 8 show the results for the other robustness concerns. In column (1) we consider
only applicant added citations. In our main results we include an indicator variable 
for whether a citation is added by the examiner. It enters signiﬁcantly and positively, 
suggesting that examiner added citations are cited faster than applicant added ones, but 
has relatively little impact on the other coeﬃcients. We show here that our results are
robust to using only those citations that were added by applicants. This cuts the sample
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O  ize dramatically (from 48,688 to 663). While the coeﬃcient estimates are unsurprisingly
uch less precise, and we are not able to estimate the full speciﬁcation (col (5) in Table 6 ),
e do still see an indication that our main results hold in this much smaller sub-sample.
In columns (2)–(3) we show results for two ten year time p erio ds. There is little
uggestion of parameter instability over these two time p erio ds, exp ect p erhaps for cross-
nventor and cross-Atlantic citations. In the earlier p erio d cross-inventor citations were
uch slower than self-citations, this eﬀect is roughly halved in the later p erio d. Cross-
tlantic citations on the other hand become slower (compared to within Europe citations)
n the later p erio d. 
In column (4) we use publication date rather than priority date. A potential concern
s that our ﬁnding, that citation duration within-ﬁrm is faster than between-ﬁrm, could
e due to an obvious and trivial explanation that arises due to the institutions governing
he patent system. Patent applications are not published immediately, but are normally
ublished 18 months (540 days) after the priority date. It could simply be that this delay
eads to a delay in information transmission between ﬁrms. While this is a market friction,
t is perhaps not the most interesting friction. In column (4), we show that this is not the
ey factor driving our results, and that the evidence suggests that there are non-trivial
arket imperfections that drive this delay. We do this by using the publication date
rather than the priority) date of the cited application. Speciﬁcally, in column (4), the
itation duration is deﬁned to be the time between the publication dates of the cited and
iting patent, where 540 days are subtracted for cross-inventor citations. Inventors outside
he ﬁrm should not have information on a patent application until it is published (except
erhaps through tacit knowledge gained through interaction of investors at conferences
tc.). Indeed we do not see any citations occurring before the publication date of cited
atent. The results in column (4) are similar to those in column (5) in Table 6 . In addition
o using the corrected publication date, we also consider the subsample of cross-inventor
itations only in column (6). The results in column (6) are again similar to those in
olumn (5) in Table 6 . 
. Summary and discussion 
We ﬁnd robust empirical evidence that market frictions exist and that they are sub-
tantial in the market for technology. Firm boundaries lead to slower citation times.
ur baseline regression results imply that the delay caused by ﬁrm boundaries is about
36 days (0.32 × 736) on average, much larger than the delay due to national borders or
echnological distance. These results speak to the debate on how well technology markets
ork. The theoretical literature emphasizes the importance of these frictions, but there
as been relatively less empirical work. Our results suggest that the empirical magnitude
f market frictions are substantial, and we interpret our evidence as pointing towards
ubstantial imperfections in the market for technology. 
Our paper has some limitations and we would like to end with a number of caveats.
ur theoretical model is highly stylized and therefore we cannot exclude other possible
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 reasons for the observed cross-ﬁrm citation lags. For example, the citation lags may 
result from the delay due to learning or ﬁrms’ strategic behaviors regarding ﬁrm-speciﬁc 
specializations in R&D and strategic choices in investments. In this paper, we establish 
that our simple model’s predictions are consistent with the empirical ﬁndings and leave it
a topic for future research to establish the tight links between the observed citation lags
and ﬁrms’ behaviors. In addition, as with all empirical work, we are only able to identify
the parameters relevant for the time p erio d that our data covers; it is possible that the
world has changed since then. New information and communication technologies have 
reduced search costs, and it could be that these frictions have reduced in recent years.
In the robustness section we do not see evidence of any major changes between 1985–
1994 and 1995–2004, but it is of course possible that more recent years would look more
diﬀerent; we leave this to future work with more recent data. 
Finally, while we have shown robust evidence that some sort of frictions are likely to
be present, we have not addressed the sources of these frictions and why they might arise,
which is important for policy formulation. There are a number of possible reasons, for
example, frictions arising due to diﬃculties in writing or comprehending a new technology, 
intentional and strategic hiding by rivals, or uncertainty over property right. This is an
important avenue for future research. 
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